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RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF FLORIDA'S NEW FEE
SCHEDULE FOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES
The 1961 session of the Florida Legislature enacted House Bill
No. 643, amending section 734.01 of Florida Statutes 1959, which
fixes the compensation of personal representatives of decedents' estates for ordinary services. The statute has been amended to read:
"(1) A personal representative shall be allowed all necessary expenses and attorney's fees paid in the care, management
and settlement of the estate. A personal representative shall
be allowed commissions upon the amount of the estate, real
and personal, accounted for by him as compensation for his
ordinary services as follows:
(a) For the first one thousand dollars ($1000.00) at the
rate of six per cent (6%); all above that sum and not exceeding
five thousand dollars ($5000.00) at the rate of four per cent
(4%); and all above five thousand dollars ($5000.00) at the
rate of two and one-half per cent (2s %)."
There is no manifestation of legislative intent with respect to
application of the statute to the fees of personal representatives of
estates in the process of administration as of the date the statute takes
effect. Section 2 of House Bill No. 643 states: "This act shall take
effect immediately upon becoming law." This wording evidences a
latent ambiguity as to services rendered prior to the effective date of
the statute if the personal representative has not filed a final accounting or petitioned for the allowance of a commission.
Numerous methods for the computation of personal representatives' fees have been suggested in other jurisdictions in which this
problem has arisen.' Three of the more plausible have been that
compensation should be governed by the law in effect (1) when the
various services were rendered, (2) at the time of the settlement of
the account and the making of the order allowing compensation, or
(3) at the date of the death of the decedent. Of these alternatives only
the first two have received any degree of approval from the courts.
The rule that compensation of personal representatives should be
governed by the law in effect during administration of the estate has
gained limited judicial recognition.2 The cases supporting this view
are of somewhat ancient vintage, and their holdings do not elaborate
on the comparative merits of the various methods of compensation.
I. In re Franklin, 299 P.2d 1037 (Cal. App. 1956); In re Donovan's Estate,
266 Mich. 362, 253 N.W. 552 (1934).
2. Key v. Jones, 52 Ala. 238 (1875); Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227 (1858);
Gould v. Hayes, 19 Ala. 438 (1851); Tutt v. Williams, 41 Mo. App. 662 (1890).
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Possibly the courts thought that the inherent fairness of such a system was apparent and felt no compulsion to justify their conclusions.
The rationale of the theory that compensation should be governed
by the statute in force as of the date of death of the testator is found
in a dissenting opinion in a Michigan case: 3
"The executor, in assuming his duties as such, knew the
rate of commission provided by law; and he is presumed to have
accepted the trust on that basis. An implied contract was
thereby created, with fees fixed, which could not be changed
except by consent of both parties. The executor's commissions
must, then, be determined by the statute in force at the time of
the death of the testator and the appointment of the executor.
To follow any other course would make the amendment retrospective, a construction ...

which is to be avoided unless clearly

required."
The weight of authority4 adheres to the modern trend5 in holding
that the amount of compensation is governed by the statute in effect
when the account is settled and the court orders compensation. The
jurisdictions adhering to this view approach it by varying avenues
of deduction, but their conclusions are the same. 6
In the 1923 Iowa case of In re Leigh's Estate7 there was a partial
distribution of assets prior to statutory revision of the previously
existing fee schedule. Rejecting a contention that fees should be
computed according to the statute in effect at the time of distribution,
the court ruled that fees should be computed in accordance with the
statute in force at the time of the allowance of compensation. One
year later the Iowa court again allowed the executor's fees under
the most recent statute, but in a very brief explanation of its decision
the court stated that fees must be calculated under the law as it
exists at the time of distribution.8 This statement conflicts with the
Leigh decision, which was not referred to in the opinion, but compensation under the new fee schedule was permitted in both cases.
3. In re Donovan's Estate, 266 Mich. 362, 368, 253 N.W. 552, 554 (1934).
4. See Estate of Johnston, 47 Cal. 2d 265, 303 P.2d 1 (1956); In re Franklin,
299 P.2d 1037 (Cal. App. 1956), and cases cited therein.
5. Estate of Geltrnan, 152 Cal. App. 2d 560, 314 P.2d 78 (1957); In the Matter
of Mattes, 12 Misc. 2d 502, 172 N.Y. Supp. 303 (Surr. Ct. 1958).
6. Estate of Franklin, 47 Cal. 2d 303, 303 P.2d 339 (1956); Estate of Johnston,
supra note 4; In re Leigh's Estate, 196 Iowa 1102, 195 N.W. 1005 (1923); In re
Donovan's Estate, 266 Mich. 362, 253 N.W. 552 (1934); Phraner v. Stone, 137 N.J.
Eq. 284, 44 A.2d 504 (Ch. 1945); In re Hildebrand's Estate, 57 N.M. 778, 264 P.2d
674 (1953); In the Matter of Mattes, supra note 5.
7. 196 Iowa 1102, 195 N.W. 1005 (1923).
8. Estate of Brown v. Hoge, 198 Iowa 373, 199 N.W. 320 (1924).
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In a 1923 New York case 9 administration of the estate had progressed to a final accounting, which was pending at the time the
law was amended to increase the rate of commissions allowable to
personal representatives. The court held that the commission of the
executor should be computed at the rates fixed by the amendment,
since the right to a commission accrues only when the decree settling
the final account is made.
Courts in Michigan and California have taken similar stands in
this area of the law. Starting with the older common law rule that
the office of executor is honorary and the duties are performed without remuneration or commission, 1° the courts have reasoned that the
fee of the personal representative is based upon statute and does not
arise out of a contract." The personal representative's right to compensation does not vest as of the date he qualifies as an executor or
administrator but when the order approving his petition for allowance of commission is determined and allowed.' 2 It follows that the
fee schedule in force at the time of the order will govern.
The rule that a clear expression of legislative purpose is required
to justify retroactive application is generally accepted for purposes of
statutory interpretation.13 This doctrine appears to clearly prohibit
remuneration of an executor under the provisions of a statute enacted
after his services have been rendered. However, this canon of construction is subject to an exception. A statute giving rise to a change
in remedy or procedure is applied in any proceeding subsequent to
the effective date of the statute, without regard to the time of occurrence of the events giving rise to the proceeding, if a vested right
is not thereby impaired. Neither the personal representative nor the
estate has any vested right to payment under a specified fee schedule
until the order allowing compensation is issued.' 4 A change in such
a fee schedule has been held to be a procedural change. 15
9. Matter of King, 121 Misc. 530, 201 N.Y. Supp. 239 (Surr. Ct. 1923).
10. Gaines v. Reutch, 64 Md. 517, 2 At. 913 (1886).
11. Estate of Johnston, 47 Cal. 2d 265, 303 P.2d 1 (1956); In re Donovan's
Estate, 266 Mich. 362, 253 N.W. 552 (1934).
12. Estate of Johnston, supra note 11; In re Franklin, 299 P.2d 1037 (Cal.
App. 1956); In re Donovan's Estate, supra note 11.
13. McGregor v. McGregor, 249 Ala. 75, 29 So. 2d 561 (1947); State ex rel.
Riverside Bank v. Green, 101 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1958); State ex rel. Bayless v. Lee,
156 Fla. 494, 23 So. 2d 575 (1945); Home v. State Bldg. Comm'n, 233 Miss. 810,
103 So. 2d 373 (1958); Matter of Daly, 180 App. Div. 307, 167 N.Y. Supp. 229 (1st
Dep't 1917).
14. Arques v. National Superior Co., 67 Cal. App. 2d 763, 155 P.2d 643 (1945);
Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686 (1953); Bascom v. District Ct., 231
Iowa 360, 1 N.W.2d 220 (1942); General Motors Accep. Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La.
1019, 64 So. 2d 417 (1953); Tellier v. Edwards, 56 Wash. 2d 652, 354 P.2d 925 (1960).
15. Matter of Potter, 106 Misc. 113, 175 N.Y. Supp. 598 (Surr. Ct. 1919).
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